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ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF MIXED AND
BEHAVIOR STRATEGIES IN FINITELY
ADDITIVE DECISION PROBLEMS
JÁNOS FLESCH,∗ ∗∗
DRIES VERMEULEN,∗ ∗∗∗ Maastricht University AND
ANNA ZSELEVA,∗∗∗∗ ∗∗∗∗∗ Tel Aviv University
Abstract
We consider decision problems with arbitrary action spaces, deterministic transitions,
and infinite time horizon. In the usual setup when probability measures are countably
additive, a general version of Kuhn’s theorem implies under fairly general conditions
that for every mixed strategy of the decision maker there exists an equivalent behavior
strategy. We examine to what extent this remains valid when probability measures are
only assumed to be finitely additive. Under the classical approach of Dubins and Savage
(2014), we prove the following statements: (1) If the action space is finite, every mixed
strategy has an equivalent behavior strategy. (2) Even if the action space is infinite, at
least one optimal mixed strategy has an equivalent behavior strategy. The approach by
Dubins and Savage turns out to be essentially maximal: these two statements are no
longer valid if we take any extension of their approach that considers all singleton plays.
Keywords: Mixed strategy; behavior strategy; finitely additive probability measure;
equivalent strategy; Kuhn’s theorem
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1. Introduction
We consider dynamic decision problems in which the decision maker has to choose actions
sequentially, at infinitely many periods. At each period, the decision maker can make their
choice of action depend on the history consisting of all previously chosen actions. A strategy
is a decision rule that gives a recommendation to the decision maker on how to choose actions
during the decision problem. These recommendations, however, can be given in essentially
different ways, both from a conceptual and from a technical point of view. As usual, we
distinguish three main types of strategies: pure strategies, mixed strategies, and behavior
strategies.
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A pure strategy recommends one action at every decision point, depending on the history.
This recommendation is fully deterministic.
A mixed strategy is a probability measure on the set of pure strategies. The interpretation is
that the decision maker should first draw a pure strategy according to this probability measure,
and then play the decision problem by following the recommendations of this pure strategy.
Thus, a mixed strategy uses randomization, but only once and at the very beginning of the
decision problem.
A behavior strategy specifies a probability measure on the set of actions, depending
on the history. The interpretation is that, at the current decision point, the decision maker
should choose their action according to this probability measure. Thus, a behavior strategy
uses randomization at every decision point, and consequently involves successive usage of
probability measures.
In the usual setup where probability measures are countably additive, mixed strategies
and behavior strategies are strongly connected, under fairly general conditions. Both mixed
strategies and behavior strategies induce – albeit in a different way – a probability measure
on the set of all possible sequences of actions, called plays. A mixed strategy is equivalent to
a behavior strategy if the induced probability measures are identical. This of course implies
that the induced expected payoffs are also equal, up to a measurability condition on the payoff
function. In the countably additive setup a fundamental theorem, a general version of Kuhn’s
theorem by Aumann (1964), implies under fairly general conditions that for every mixed
strategy there exists an equivalent behavior strategy. This allows us, in most models, to simply
focus on behavior strategies.
A less common, though well-established, alternative is to only assume that probability mea-
sures are finitely additive. Weakening the requirement of countable additivity to finite additivity
of course has its consequences – see the overview given later in this section. One notable
difference is that the strategic possibilities of the decision maker become richer: generally, both
the set of mixed strategies and the set of behavior strategies are strictly larger in the finitely
additive setup. This leads naturally to the question whether, or under what conditions, finitely
additive mixed and behavior strategies are equivalent. Our goal is to address this question.
In this paper we only assume that probability measures are finitely additive. From now on,
we refer to finitely additive probability measures as charges. In this setup, a mixed strategy is
a charge on the set of pure strategies, and a behavior strategy is a mapping that assigns to each
history a charge on the action space.
Since each pure strategy induces a unique play, a mixed strategy naturally induces a charge
on the set of plays. For a behavior strategy, however, it is not immediately obvious how to
define the induced charge on the set of plays. Various alternatives have been considered in
the literature, motivated mainly by conceptual but to some extent also technical reasons; see,
for example, Dubins and Savage (2014), Dubins (1974), and Purves and Sudderth (1976).
A classical approach to this question is given by Dubins and Savage (2014), whose focus is on
the the algebra of all clopen (closed and open) sets of plays, when the set of actions is endowed
with the discrete topology and the set of plays is endowed with the product topology. Then,
for each behavior strategy they define a natural charge on this algebra. This approach is rather
minimal in the sense that essentially all later papers in the literature agree to define the induced
charge on this algebra exactly the same way, and only consider the question of how to extend
it to larger algebras.
The general approach to define the charge induced by a behavior strategy on the set of plays
goes as follows: First, fix an algebra on the set of plays. Second, given this algebra, specify for
each behavior strategy a certain charge on this algebra.
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The choice of the algebra and the specification of a charge for each behavior strategy is
important, and as we will see, the results can depend on them. So one may therefore wonder
how to choose them. The specific choice of the algebra can depend on conceptual grounds,
e.g. which sets we find natural and which sets we think should be assigned a probability under
each behavior strategy. But this choice can also be motivated from a technical point of view,
e.g. what type of sets we want to consider, and later what type of charges we want to define
for behavior strategies. The choice of the specification of a charge on this algebra for each
behavior strategy is again both a conceptual and a technical matter.
Given an algebra on the set of plays and a specification of a charge on this algebra for each
behavior strategy, we define equivalence between mixed and behavior strategies. We say that a
mixed strategy and a behavior strategy are equivalent whenever they generate the same charge
on the chosen algebra.
Moreover, if the payoff function is integrable with respect to this algebra, then each behavior
strategy induces a unique expected payoff. This allows us to define optimality for behavior
strategies.
1.1. Overview of our contribution
In this paper we show the following results on the equivalence between mixed and behavior
strategies.
(i) Every behavior strategy has an equivalent mixed strategy, under general conditions (see
Theorem 2).
(ii) If the action space is finite, every mixed strategy has an equivalent behavior strategy
under the classical approach given by Dubins and Savage (2014) on the algebra of all
clopen sets (see Theorem 4). This algebra turns out to be essentially maximal: for any
larger algebra that contains each singleton play, there is a mixed strategy that has no
equivalent behavior strategy (see Theorem 6). This negative result also applies to the
Borel sigma-algebra, which plays an important role in various models.
We remark that if the action space is infinite, it follows from an example in Dubins
(1975) that there is a mixed strategy without an equivalent behavior strategy (see
Theorem 3), even under the approach of Dubins and Savage (2014).
In addition, we also investigate how far the equivalence between mixed and behavior
strategies goes when we only consider optimal mixed and optimal behavior strategies. It is of
course always true that if a mixed strategy is optimal and has an equivalent behavior strategy,
then this behavior strategy is also optimal. Conversely, if a behavior strategy is optimal, then
every equivalent mixed strategy is also optimal. We show the following results:
(iii) An optimal mixed strategy always exists (see Theorem 1). (An optimal pure strategy
does not necessarily exist. Indeed, whenever the payoff function has no maximum, the
decision maker has no optimal pure strategy.)
(iv) An optimal behavior strategy always exists under the approach by Dubins and Savage
(2014), even if the action space is infinite (see Theorem 5). Thus, there always exists an
optimal mixed strategy that has an equivalent behavior strategy under the approach by
Dubins and Savage.
(v) The clopen algebra considered in Dubins and Savage (2014) turns out to be essentially
maximal: for any larger algebra that contains each singleton play there is a payoff
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function for which the decision maker has no optimal behavior strategy (see Theorem 8).
That is, behavior strategies strictly underperform compared to mixed strategies.
To sum up, every behavior strategy has an equivalent mixed strategy, but not necessarily the
other way around. There is always an optimal mixed strategy; however, an optimal behavior
strategy does not always exist. Generally speaking, our results suggest that mixed strategies
may be more suitable for studying finitely additive decision problems.
1.2. Related literature
1.2.1. Finite additivity. There are different ways of defining probabilities. Countable additivity
is a usual assumption of probability. However, from a conceptual point of view, the weaker
assumption of finite additivity has also been argued for; see, for example, Savage (1972), de
Finetti (1975), and Dubins and Savage (2014). Since finite additivity is the weaker assumption,
it is also more basic. It allows for a richer class of probabilities, and facilitates constructions
such as a uniform probability distribution over the natural numbers (see Schirokauer and
Kadane (2007)). For a more extensive summary of the history of finite additivity and its relation
to countable additivity, see Bingham (2010).
1.2.2. Dynamic decision problems. As mentioned earlier, Dubins and Savage (2014) studied
the same type of decision problems as we do, and more concretely the algebra generated by the
clopen sets. Dubins (1974) considered the same type of problems, but considered the algebra
generated by the open sets. Purves and Sudderth (1976) went further, considering the Borel
sigma-algebra.
Sudderth (2016) wrote about finitely additive dynamic programming. His model includes
finitely additive strategies and an infinite time horizon, as does ours. However, his model has
states and probabilistic transitions, and the payoff is some type of aggregation of daily payoffs,
for example by discounting. The paper also contains comparisons with the countably additive
theory. For example, it shows that there are cases when there exists a finitely additive optimal
stationary strategy; in contrast, a countably additive one need not exist.
Charges also gained recognition in game theory, such as in Maitra and Sudderth (1993),
Marinacci (1997), Maitra and Sudderth (1998), Harris et al. (2005), Capraro and Scarsini
(2013), and Flesch et al. (2017), but to a lesser extent.
1.2.3. Equivalent strategies. Equivalence between mixed and behavior strategies was origi-
nally investigated by Kuhn (1953), and in a more general version by Aumann (1964). We also
refer to Takahashi (1969) and Maschler et al. (2013), Theorem 6.15. Muraviev et al. (2017)
extended Kuhn’s result to Ellsberg decision problems. Aryal and Stauber (2014) showed the
limits of extending Kuhn’s theorem in the case of ambiguity-averse players. In the finitely
additive setup, as mentioned above, Dubins (1975) showed a mixed strategy without an
equivalent behavior strategy in a decision problem with an infinite action space.
1.3. Structure of the paper
In Section 2 we discuss some preliminaries on charges. In Section 3 we present the model.
In Section 4 we define the charges that mixed and respectively behavior strategies induce on
the set of plays, which leads to the definition of equivalence between mixed and behavior
strategies, as well as to expected payoffs and the definition of optimality. Our investigation of
the equivalence between mixed and behavior strategies is in Section 5 under the approach of
Dubins and Savage, and in Section 6 on algebras that are larger than the clopen algebra they
considered.
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2. Preliminaries
In this section we provide a brief summary of (probability) charges. For further reading, we
refer to Dunford and Schwartz (1964) and Rao and Rao (1983).
2.1. Charges
Let X be a nonempty set and let P be an algebra on X. A probability charge, or simply
charge, on (X,P) is a function μ : P → [0, 1] such that μ(X) = 1 and, for all disjoint sets
E, F ∈P , μ(E ∪ F) =μ(E) +μ(F). A charge is thus finitely additive, but not necessarily
countably additive. We denote the set of all charges on (X,P) by C(X,P), and use the notation
μ(x) instead of μ({x}).
When X is countably infinite, we say that μ ∈ C(X, 2X) is a diffuse charge if μ(x) = 0 for
every x ∈ X. Diffuse charges are not countably additive. It follows from the axiom of choice
that diffuse charges exist (see, for example, Rao and Rao (1983), p. 38).
The following statement follows from Theorem 2 in Los and Marczewski (1949) together
with the axiom of choice: If P is an algebra on X and μ is a charge on (X,P), then there exists
a charge ν on (X, 2X) such that ν(E) =μ(E) for all E ∈P . We say that ν extends μ.
2.2. Integration with respect to charges
Let P be an algebra on X. A function s : X →R is called a P-measurable simple function if
s = ∑mi=1 ciIBi , where c1, . . . , cm ∈R, {B1, . . . , Bm} is a P-measurable partition of X, and IBi
is the characteristic function of the set Bi. Let μ be a charge on (X,P). The integral of s with
respect to μ is defined by
∫
X s dμ=
∑m
i=1 ci ·μ(Bi).
Let μ be a charge on (X,P). For a bounded function f : X →R, the lower integral of f
with respect to μ is defined as the supremum of all real numbers
∫
X s dμ, where s is a P-
measurable simple function with s ≤ f . The upper integral of f is defined analogously. The
function f : X →R is called P-integrable if for each μ ∈ C(X,P), the lower and the upper
integrals of f with respect to μ coincide. It follows from Theorems 4.5.7 and 4.7.3 in Rao and
Rao (1983) that f is P-integrable if and only if for every ε > 0 there exists a P-measurable
simple function f ′:P →R such that | f ( p) − f ′( p)| ≤ ε for every p ∈ P. Consequently, any
bounded function f : X →R is 2X-integrable. P-integrability is sometimes called uniform P-
approachability of f . Similar conditions also appear for example in Section 4 of Marinacci
(1997) and Section 2.1.3 of Harris et al. (2005), albeit in a different context. Notice that if the
function f is P-integrable, then it is also P ′-integrable for all P ′ ⊃P .
3. The model
3.1. The decision problem
Let A be an action set having at least two elements. Let H denote the set of finite sequences
in A, including the empty sequence ø. Let P denote the set of infinite sequences in A. Elements
of A are called actions, elements of H are called histories, and elements of P are called plays.
Let u:P →R be a bounded function, called the payoff function.
Consider the following decision problem. At each period t = 1, 2, . . ., the decision maker
chooses an action at from A, knowing the previous choices (a1, . . . , at−1) ∈ H. This induces
a play p = (a1, a2, . . . ). The payoff of the decision maker is u( p). (Note that the set of
available actions does not depend on the history of the decision problem, and is always A.
Moreover, notice that our model is equivalent to a model with a state variable and deterministic
transitions.)
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A strategy is a decision rule that gives a recommendation to the decision maker for choosing
actions. These recommendations can be given in essentially different ways, and based on that
we distinguish three different types of strategies: pure strategies, mixed strategies, and behavior
strategies. We discuss each type of strategy in turn.
3.2. Pure strategies
A pure strategy is a function f :H → A. The interpretation is that if history h arises during
the decision problem, then the strategy f recommends that the decision maker choose action
f (h). Note that a pure strategy is completely deterministic.
Each pure strategy f induces a unique play pf . Of course, two different pure strategies can
induce the same play, but any play can be generated by at least one pure strategy. We denote
the set of pure strategies by F.
3.3. Mixed strategies
A mixed strategy is a charge m ∈ C(F, 2F) on the set of pure strategies. The interpretation
is that the decision maker should draw a pure strategy f according to m, and play the decision
problem by using f . Note that a pure strategy can be seen as a mixed strategy that places
probability 1 on this pure strategy.
3.4. Behavior strategies
A behavior strategy is a function b:H → C(A, 2A). The interpretation is that if history h
arises during the decision problem, then the strategy b recommends that the decision maker
choose an action according to the charge b(h).
Thus, a behavior strategy successively uses an infinite sequence of charges during the play.
Consequently, a behavior strategy that places probability 1 on an action at at every period t
does not necessarily induce the play (a1, a2, . . . ) with probability 1 in our finitely additive
setting. So, a pure strategy cannot necessarily be identified with the behavior strategy placing
probability 1 on the corresponding actions. This is in sharp contrast with the countably additive
setup (see Section 6).
4. Induced charges on the set P of plays, expected payoffs, and optimality
In this section we define and discuss the charges that mixed and respectively behavior
strategies induce on the set P of plays. This allows us to calculate expected payoffs, define
optimality, and define equivalence between mixed and behavior strategies.
4.1. Mixed strategies
In this subsection we consider mixed strategies. First, we define the charge that a mixed
strategy induces on a set of plays. This allows us to calculate the expected payoff for each
mixed strategy and define optimal mixed strategies. Finally, we show that an optimal mixed
strategy always exists.
A pure strategy f induces a unique play pf . Naturally, a mixed strategy m generates a charge
m∗ on (P, 2P), given for every Q ⊆ P by
m∗(Q) = m ({ f ∈ F:pf ∈ Q}). (1)
Note that, as different pure strategies can induce the same play, different mixed strategies can
induce the same charge on (P, 2P).
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A pure strategy f induces the payoff U( f ) = u( pf ). As a mixed strategy m prescribes
drawing a pure strategy f according to the charge m defined on (F, 2F), the expected payoff for
the mixed strategy m is given by
U(m) =
∫
f ∈F
U( f ) m(df ). (2)
The next lemma claims that the expected payoff for a mixed strategy can also be calculated
through the induced charge on (P, 2P). The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Lemma 1. For every mixed strategy m,
U(m) =
∫
p∈P
u( p) m∗(dp).
We call a pure strategy f optimal if U( f ) = supp∈P u( p). Similarly, we call a mixed strategy
m optimal if U(m) = supp∈P u( p).
It is not always true that there exists a pure optimal strategy, since the payoff function u
might not have a maximum, for example when the range of u is the set {1 − 1/n:n ∈N}.
However, it is easy to see that an optimal mixed strategy always exists.
Theorem 1. An optimal mixed strategy always exists.
Proof. Let U∗ = supp∈P u( p). For each n ∈N, let pn ∈ P be a play such that u( pn) ≥ U∗ −
1
n , and let fn denote a pure strategy that induces the play pn.
Let τ be a diffuse charge on (N, 2N). Now consider the mixed strategy m that, intuitively,
first chooses a natural number n ∈N according to τ and then plays the pure strategy fn.
Formally, for every subset F′ of the set F of pure strategies we have
m(F′) = τ ({n ∈N | fn ∈ F′}).
Let K ∈N. Since
m({ fK, fK+1, . . .}) = τ ({K,K + 1, . . .}) = 1,
it follows from (2) that
U(m) =
∫
f ∈F
U( f ) m(df ) =
∫
f ∈{ fK ,fK+1,...}
U( f ) m(df ) ≥ U∗ − 1
K
.
As this holds for every K ∈N, we have U(m) = U∗. 
4.2. Behavior strategies
In this subsection we turn to behavior strategies. We consider algebras on the set of plays
that satisfy a minimal richness condition. We call such algebras competent. Then, we define the
charge that a behavior strategy induces on such a competent algebra. Based on these induced
charges, we define optimal behavior strategies.
For a history h ∈ H and a play p ∈ P we use the notation h ≺ p if the play p starts with the
history h. For two histories h, h′ ∈ H we use the notation h  h′ if the history h′ starts with h
(allowing h′ = h), and use the notation h ≺ h′ if h′ starts with h and h′ is strictly longer than h.
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We now discuss the algebras that we consider on the set of plays. Arguably, a minimal
requirement on the algebra is that it should contain all subsets of plays that are determined in
finite time. More precisely, for every n ∈N and S ⊆ An, the algebra should contain the set
[S] = {p ∈ P | there exists h ∈ S with h ≺ p}.
Thus, a play p = (a1, a2, . . . ) belongs to [S], where S ⊆ An, if and only if (a1, . . . , an) belongs
to S. For the special case when S = {(a1, a2, . . . , an)} is a singleton set, for convenience we
write [a1, a2, . . . , an] instead of [{(a1, a2, . . . , an)}].
Let Rf denote the set of all sets [S], where S ⊆ An for some n ∈N. The superscript f refers
to a finite horizon. The set Rf consists of the so-called ‘finite-dimensional’ subsets of the set
P of plays. The following statement is well known and easy to verify.
Lemma 2. Rf is an algebra.
Take a behavior strategy b and a set [S], where S ⊆ An for some n ∈N. It is natural and
standard to calculate the probability of the set [S] under b through n iterated integrals as
follows: let
cf(b)([S]) =
∫
a1∈A
· · ·
∫
an∈A
IS(a1, . . . , an) b(a1, . . . , an−1)(dan) · · · b(ø)(da1). (3)
Note that cf(b) is a charge on the algebra Rf. In the language of Dubins and Savage, cf(b)([S])
is nothing but the strategic probability of [S].
Definition 1. An algebra P of P is called competent if P ⊇Rf. Given a competent algebra P ,
a P-specification is a function ψP that to each behavior strategy b assigns a charge ψP (b) on
(P,P) with the requirement that, for all sets [S] ∈Rf,
ψP (b)([S]) = cf(b)([S]).
Thus, given a competent algebra P and a behavior strategy b, a P-specification ψP assigns
a probability ψP (b)(R) to each set R in the algebra P , the only requirement being that ψP
coincides with cf on the algebra Rf.
Note that Rf, in view of Lemma 2, is a competent algebra of P, and cf, defined in (3), is an
Rf-specification.
Let P be a competent algebra of P, and let ψP be a P-specification. Assume that the payoff
function u is P-integrable. Then, for every behavior strategy b, the payoff function u has the
same lower and upper integrals with respect to ψP (b), which we denote by U(b | P, ψP ).
Based on this observation, we can define optimality for behavior strategies.
Definition 2. Let P be a competent algebra of P, and let ψP be a P-specification. Assume
that the payoff function u is P-integrable. A behavior strategy b is called (P, ψP )-optimal if
U(b | P, ψP ) = supp∈P u( p).
4.3. Equivalence of strategies
Consider a competent algebra P on P. Each mixed strategy m induces a charge mP on
(P,P), which is the restriction of the charge m∗ defined in (1) to the algebra P . Also, given a
P-specification ψP , each behavior strategy b induces a charge ψP (b) on (P,P). This allows
us to define equivalence between strategies.
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Definition 3. Let P be a competent algebra of P, and let ψP be a P-specification. A mixed
strategy m and a behavior strategy b are said to be (P, ψP )-equivalent if they generate the
same charge on (P,P), i.e. mP (Q) =ψP (b)(Q) for every set Q ∈P .
According to the next theorem, we can find an equivalent mixed strategy for every behavior
strategy under general conditions. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Let P be an algebra of P, and let ψP be a P-specification. Then for every
behavior strategy there exists a (P, ψP )-equivalent mixed strategy.
The converse, when for a given mixed strategy we try to find an equivalent behavior strategy,
is much more complicated. This is highlighted by a two-period decision problem in Section 2
of Dubins (1975), with action space N at period 1 and only two actions at period 2. In this
decision problem there is a mixed strategy for which there is no (Rf, cf)-equivalent behavior
strategy. This example is rather minimal, since for lack of equivalence at least two time periods
are needed and in at least one time period there have to be infinitely many actions. For the proof
Dubins refers to an implicit argument in de Finetti (1972). The following theorem follows
directly from this example. Since our terminology is different, we provide a proof along the
construction of Dubins (1975).
Theorem 3. Assume that the action space is infinite. Then there is a mixed strategy that has no
(P, ψP )-equivalent behavior strategy for any competent algebra P and P-specification ψP .
Proof. For simplicity, assume that N⊆ A. For each n ∈N, consider pure strategies fn and gn
that induce the plays pn = (n, 1, 1, . . . ) and qn = (n, 2, 2, . . . ), respectively. Let τ f be a diffuse
charge on (N, 2N) and let τ g be the countably additive probability measure on (N, 2N) with
τ g(n) = 12n for each n ∈N.
Following Dubins (1975), we define a mixed strategy m that, intuitively, gives a recom-
mendation for a pure strategy in the following way: (1) with probability 12 , it chooses n ∈N
according to τ f and recommends the pure strategy fn; and (2) with probability 12 , it chooses
n ∈N according to τ g and recommends the pure strategy gn.
More precisely, for every subset F′ of the set of pure strategies F we have
m(F′) = 1
2
· τ f ({n ∈N | fn ∈ F′}) + 1
2
· τ g({n ∈N | gn ∈ F′}).
This mixed strategy m does not have a (P, ψP )-equivalent behavior strategy for any
competent algebra P and P-specification ψP . Indeed, suppose by way of contradiction
that a behavior strategy b is (P, ψP )-equivalent to m for some competent algebra P and
P-specification ψP .
Step 1. For every W ∈P it holds that
m∗(W) = 1
2
· τ f ({n ∈N | pn ∈ W}) + 1
2
· τ g({n ∈N | qn ∈ W}).
Consequently, we have the following under the mixed strategy m for every n ∈N:
[1] The first action is n with probability
m∗([n]) = 1
2
· τ f (n) + 1
2
· τ g(n) = 0 + 1
2n+1
= 1
2n+1
.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jpr.2019.47
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universiteit Maastricht, on 19 Nov 2020 at 07:52:37, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies 819
[2] The histories (n, 1) and (n, 2) have probability
m∗([n, 1]) = 1
2
· τ f (n) = 0 and m∗([n, 2]) = 1
2
· τ g(n) = 1
2n+1
.
Note that the sets [n], [n, 1], and [n, 2] belong to P , as the algebra P is competent.
Step 2. Since the behavior strategy b is (P, ψP )-equivalent to m, we have for every n ∈N that
b(ø)(n) = 1
2n+1
, b(n)(1) = 0, b(n)(2) = 1.
That is, b recommends to choose action n at period 1 with probability 1
2n+1 , and after
choosing any action n at period 1, b recommends to choose action 2 at period 2.
Step 3. Let W be the set of plays that have action 2 at period 2. Since the algebra P is
competent, W ∈P . Because b(n)(2) = 1 for all n ∈N, we have ψP (b)(W) = 1, which,
however, contradicts m∗(W) = 12 .
Thus, m has no (P, ψP )-equivalent behavior strategy, as claimed above. 
5. The approach to behavior strategies by Dubins and Savage
We defined equivalence between mixed and behavior strategies based on the choices of the
competent algebra on the set of plays and the specification that assigns a probability to each
set in the algebra under any behavior strategy. A classical approach was given by Dubins and
Savage (2014), who proposed taking the algebra of all clopen (closed and open) sets of plays
and a corresponding specification with a consistency property. (Dubins and Savage did not use
the terminology ‘specification’.) This section is devoted to this approach.
5.1. The algebra RDS of clopen sets and the RDS-specification ψDS
Following Dubins and Savage, we endow the set A of actions with the discrete topology
and the set P of plays with the induced product topology. In this topology, a set Q ⊆ P is open
exactly when for every play p ∈ Q there is a history h ≺ p such that [h] ⊆ Q. This topological
space is completely metrizable, and it is compact if and only if A is finite (see Kechris (1995)).
Let RDS be the set of all clopen subsets of P (the superscript DS refers to Dubins
and Savage). The following lemma summarizes the basic properties of RDS (see also
Theorem 2.9.1 in Dubins and Savage (2014)). The proofs are straightforward and are therefore
omitted.
Lemma 3. The collection RDS has the following properties: (1) RDS is an algebra. (2) RDS ⊇
Rf, and hence RDS is competent. (3) RDS =Rf if and only if the action set A is finite.
Now we turn to the specification suggested by Dubins and Savage. In order to state it
precisely, we need some notation.
Consider a decision problem G with action set A and payoff function u. For a period k ∈N
and a history h ∈ Ak, we denote the subproblem that starts at history h by G|h. The subproblem
is played as follows. At periods n ≥ k + 1, the decision maker chooses an action an ∈ A,
which induces a play (ak+1, ak+2, . . . ) and a corresponding payoff u|h(ak+1, ak+2, . . . ) =
u(h, ak+1, ak+2, . . . ). Thus, G|h can be seen as the continuation of the decision problem G
given that the history h has arisen. In fact, G|h is a decision problem itself according to our
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definition (up to the inessential change that the first period has label k + 1), with action set A
and payoff function u|h. Note that the set of plays is also P = AN in G|h. It is easy to verify that
if Q is a clopen set of plays, then the continuation of Q in the subproblem G|h,
Q|h = {(ak+1, ak+2, . . . ) : (h, ak+1, ak+2, . . . ) ∈ Q},
is also clopen. That is, if Q ∈RDS then Q|h ∈RDS.
A behavior strategy b in the decision problem G induces a behavior strategy b|h in the
subproblem G|h in a natural way: for any k′ ≥ k and any sequence (ak+1, ak+2, . . . , ak′ ) of
actions,
b|h(ak+1, ak+2, . . . , ak′ ) = b(h, ak+1, ak+2, . . . , ak′ ).
The strategy b|h is often called the continuation strategy of b at history h. Thus, for every
behavior strategy b, an RDS-specification ψ defines a charge ψ(b|h) ∈ C(P,RDS).
Lemma 4. There exists a unique RDS-specification ψ with the following property: for every
behavior strategy b, for every history h, and for every Q ∈RDS,
ψ(b|h)(Q|h) =
∫
a∈A
ψ(b|ha)(Q|ha) b(h)(da).
So, there is a unique RDS-specification ψ such that, for each behavior strategy b, history h,
action a, and for every clopen set, the corresponding probability under ψ(b|h) should be equal
to the expectation of the probability at the next period under ψ(b|ha). This lemma is essentially
Theorem 2.8.1 in Dubins and Savage (2014); Theorem 4.1 in Purves and Sudderth (1976) is
also similar.
We define ψDS to be the unique RDS-specification in Lemma 4. Note that by the definition
of an RDS-specification, we have for every behavior strategy b and every Q ∈Rf that
ψDS(b)(Q) = cf(b)(Q). (4)
The next lemma conveys a useful property of the RDS-specification ψDS. The proof can be
found in the Appendix.
Lemma 5. Consider a behavior strategy b and let Q be a nonempty element of RDS. Assume
that for every history h ∈ H for which Q|h =∅ we have
b(h)({a ∈ A:Q|(h,a) =∅}) = 1.
Then ψDS(b)(Q) = 1.
The above lemma has the following meaning. Consider a nonempty clopen set Q of plays.
A history h is consistent with Q if Q contains a play that starts with h, i.e. Q|h =∅. Consider
a behavior strategy b. Assume that whenever a history h is consistent with Q, then the charge
b(h) places probability 1 on those actions that keep the history consistent with Q. Then, the set
Q has probability 1 under b, with respect to the RDS-specification ψDS.
5.2. Equivalence from mixed strategies to behavior strategies
In this subsection we analyze when a mixed strategy has an equivalent behavior strategy
within the setting of the previous subsection.
We already know from Theorem 3 that when the action space is infinite, there is a mixed
strategy without an (RDS, ψDS)-equivalent behavior strategy. In contrast, when the action
space is finite, we obtain a positive result.
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Theorem 4. Suppose that the action space A is finite. Then for every mixed strategy there
exists an (RDS, ψDS)-equivalent behavior strategy.
Proof. Take a mixed strategy m. Let Hm denote the set of histories h that are reached with
positive probability under m, i.e. m∗([h])> 0.
We define a behavior strategy b. Take a history h ∈ H. If h ∈ H \ Hm, then b(h) is an arbitrary
charge on (A, 2A). If h ∈ Hm, then define b(h) by for every a ∈ A letting
b(h)(a) = m
∗([h, a])
m∗([h])
.
Now it follows for any history h = (a1, . . . , an), by induction on the length n of the history,
that
m∗([h]) =ψDS(b)([h]) = b(ø)(a1) · · · b(a1, . . . , an−1)(an).
Since the action space A is finite, this implies directly that m∗(Q) =ψDS(b)(Q) for every
Q ∈ Rf. Because Rf =RDS by Lemma 3, the behavior strategy b is (RDS, ψDS)-equivalent
to m. 
5.3. Existence of an optimal behavior strategy
We now prove that, in the approach of Dubins and Savage, an optimal behavior strategy
always exists provided that the payoff function is integrable.
Theorem 5. For every RDS-integrable payoff function u, there exists an (RDS, ψDS)-optimal
behavior strategy.
Proof. We begin by giving the idea of the proof. Suppose that the payoff function u is
RDS-integrable. Let U∗ = supp∈P u( p). Without being precise, the main idea is to construct
a sequence of clopen sets B1 ⊇ B2 ⊇ B3 ⊇ · · · of plays such that the best value of u on Bn
converges to U∗:
lim
n→∞ supp∈Bn
u( p) = U∗. (5)
Let us say that a history h is consistent with Bn if Bn contains a play that starts with h. This
means that at h we still have the possibility to stay in Bn.
We then construct a behavior strategy b that behaves as follows. Consider a history h. There
are three cases. If h is not consistent with any Bn, then b(h) is arbitrary. If h is consistent
with B1, . . . , Bn but not with Bn+1, Bn+2, . . ., then b(h) places probability 1 on an action
that keeps consistency with Bn. Finally, if h is consistent with every Bn, then b(h) intuitively
recommends choosing a natural number n according to a diffuse charge on (N, 2N) and then
playing an action that keeps consistency with Bn. So, the idea of the behavior strategy b is to
stay consistent with Bn for as large values of n as possible. It will then follow from (5) that b
is (RDS, ψDS)-optimal, as desired.
The formal proof consists of four steps.
Step 1. In this part of the proof we construct a number of objects:
(i) For every n ∈N, we construct an RDS-measurable simple function un of the form
un( p) =
∑
B∈Bn
cB · IB( p),
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where cB ∈R for every B ∈Bn and Bn ⊆RDS is a finite partition of P. Our
construction guarantees that the following properties hold for every n ∈N:
(i.1) un ≤ u; (i.2) supp∈P |un( p) − u( p)| ≤ 1n for every play p ∈ P; and (i.3) the
partition Bn+1 is (weakly) finer than the partition Bn: every set in Bn+1 is a subset
of a set in Bn.
(ii) For every n ∈N we identify a set Bn ∈Bn such that (ii.1) for every n ∈N, Bn ⊇
Bn+1; (ii.2) cBn converges to U∗ as n tends to infinity.
Construction for (i): The function u is RDS-integrable. Hence, as discussed in
Section 2, for every n ∈N there exists an RDS-measurable simple function vn such
that supp∈P |vn( p) − u( p)| ≤ 12n for every play p ∈ P. Let un( p) = vn( p) − 12n for every
play p ∈ P. Then, for every n ∈N, un is an RDS-measurable simple function such that
un ≤ u and supp∈P |un( p) − u( p)| ≤ 1n for every play p ∈ P. So, (i.1) and (i.2) hold. For
each n ∈N, let Bn ⊆RDS be the partition of the set P of plays corresponding to un.
By splitting sets in B2 if necessary, we can achieve that B2 is (weakly) finer than the
partition B1. Next, by splitting sets in B3 if necessary, we can achieve that B3 is (weakly)
finer than the partition B2. By continuing this way, we can make sure that (i.3) holds as
well.
Construction for (ii): For every n ∈N let the play pn ∈ P be such that u( pn) ≥ U∗ − 1n .
Because the partition B1 is finite, there exists a set B1 ∈B1 such that the set {m ∈N:pm ∈
B1} is infinite. Because B2 is finer than B1, there also exists a set B2 ∈B2 such that
B2 ⊆ B1 and the set {m ∈N:pm ∈ B2} is infinite. Continuing in this way we define Bn for
each n ∈N, and then (ii.1) holds. Now assume that pm ∈ Bn for some m, n ∈N. Then, by
the choice of the play pm, by (i.2), and by pm ∈ Bn, we have
U∗ − 1
m
≤ u( pm) ≤ un( pm) + 1
n
= cBn +
1
n
. (6)
As the set {m ∈N:pm ∈ Bn} is infinite, the inequality (6) holds for infinitely many m ∈N,
and hence
U∗ ≤ cBn +
1
n
.
This implies that (ii.2) holds as well.
Step 2. In this step we construct a behavior strategy b. First, we need some notation. Take a
history h ∈ H. Let
N∗h = {n ∈N:[h] ∩ Bn =∅}.
Intuitively, n ∈ N∗h means that the history h is consistent with the set Bn in the sense that
there is a play in Bn that extends h. More precisely, if n ∈ N∗h , then there is a play pnh ∈Bn
such that h ≺ pnh, and hence there is an action anh ∈ A, i.e. the action in pnh after h, such
that (h, anh) ≺ pnh. Notice the following properties for any history h ∈ H:
(a) If m ∈ N∗h and n ≤ m, then n ∈ N∗h and n ∈ N∗(h,amh ). We prove this property.
Assume m ∈ N∗h and n ≤ m. Then, by (ii.1), [h] ∩Bn ⊇ [h] ∩Bm =∅, and hence
n ∈ N∗h .
Further, as m ∈ N∗h , we have pmh ∈ [(h, amh )] ∩Bm, which implies that [(h, amh )] ∩
Bm =∅. Hence, m ∈ N∗(h,amh ). By the previous part, n ∈ N
∗
(h,amh )
.
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(b) We have one of the following three cases: N∗h is empty, or N∗h = {1, . . . ,m} for
some m ∈N, or N∗h =N. This follows from property (a).
Now we define a behavior strategy b. Take an arbitrary history h ∈ H. We need to define
the charge b(h) ∈ C(A, 2A). Based on property (b), we distinguish three different cases. If
N∗h is empty, then let b(h) be an arbitrary charge on the action space. If N∗h = {1, . . . ,m}
for some m ∈N, then define b(h) to be the Dirac charge on amh . That is, for every set
B ⊆ A, we have b(h)(B) = 1 if amh ∈ B and b(h)(B) = 0 if amh /∈ B. Finally, if N∗h =N, then
let τ be a diffuse charge on (N, 2N), and define b(h) by for each A′ ⊆ A letting
b(h)(A′) = τ ({n ∈N:anh ∈ A′}).
Intuitively, in this final case b(h) recommends choosing a natural number n according to
τ and then playing the action anh. So, in all three cases the idea of the behavior strategy
b is to stay consistent with Bn for as large values of n as possible.
Step 3. We show that ψDS(b)(Bn) = 1 for every n ∈N. Take n ∈N. We prove this by applying
Lemma 5. Let Q = Bn. We already know that Q is clopen, as Q = Bn ∈Bn ⊆RDS. Take
a history h ∈ H, and assume that Q|h =∅. Then there is a play p ∈ Q such that p  h.
Thus, n ∈ N∗h =∅.
In view of property (b), we have two cases. Assume first that N∗h = {1, . . . ,m} for some
m ∈N. Obviously, m ≥ n. By property (a), n ∈ N∗(h,amh ). Thus, Q|(h,amh ) =∅. Recall that
b(h) is the Dirac charge on amh in this case, so b satisfies the condition of Lemma 5.
Assume next that N∗h =N. For every m ≥ n, by property (a), n ∈ N∗(h,amh ) and hence
Q|(h,amh ) =∅. As b(h)({anh, an+1h , . . .}) = 1, the strategy b satisfies the condition of
Lemma 5 in this case as well.
Thus, by Lemma 5, ψDS(b)(Q) = 1, i.e. ψDS(b)(Bn) = 1, as desired.
Step 4. We show that the behavior strategy b is (RDS, ψDS)-optimal. By (i.1) and by Step 3,
we have for every n ∈N that
∫
p∈P
u( p)ψDS(b)(dp) ≥
∫
p∈P
un( p)ψ
DS(b)(dp) = cBn .
Hence, by (ii.2), ∫
p∈P
u( p)ψDS(b)(dp) = U∗.
This completes the proof. 
6. Extension of the Dubins and Savage approach to larger algebras
In the previous section we considered the classical approach by Dubins and Savage based
on the algebra of clopen sets of plays. There have been several attempts to extend this algebra
so that a probability can be assigned to a larger class of sets under every behavior strategy. One
common aspect of these extensions is to include each singleton play.
One essential motivation to consider algebras that contain singleton plays is the following.
Take any play p and a behavior strategy that tries to induce the play p by choosing the
corresponding actions with probability 1. Since the set {p} is not open, it is not clopen either,
and hence in the approach of Dubins and Savage we do not assign a probability to the set
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{p}. Therefore, we cannot say that the behavior strategy induces p with probability 1. This
is, of course, fully acceptable in the context of finite additivity, as implementing b involves
successive usage of an infinite sequence of charges. Yet, it is certainly natural to extend the
algebra so that it includes all singleton plays and define the specification in such a way that
the behavior strategy above induces probability 1 on the set {p}. Clearly, this brings us a step
closer to countable additivity.
Consider a competent algebra P on the set P of plays with {p} ∈P for every play p ∈ P. We
say that a P-specification ψP respects singleton plays if for each behavior strategy b and each
play p = (a1, a2, . . . ) we have
ψP (b)({p}) =
∞∏
n=1
b(a1, . . . , an−1)(an). (7)
In this section, first we examine when a mixed strategy has an equivalent behavior strategy
with respect to a competent algebra that contains all singleton plays and a specification that
respects singleton plays. Second, we investigate the existence of an optimal behavior strategy.
6.1. Equivalence from mixed strategies to behavior strategies
We first demonstrate that even if the action space is finite, there is a mixed strategy m that
has no (P, ψP )-equivalent behavior strategy for any competent algebra P on the set P of plays
that contains all singleton plays and any P-specification ψP that respects singleton plays.
Example 1. Consider a decision problem with action space A = {c, s}. One can think of it as
a stopping problem, with c standing for ‘continue’ and s standing for ‘stop’. For every n ∈N,
let fn be a pure strategy that prescribes action c at all periods before n and action s at period n.
Let τ be a diffuse charge on (N, 2N). Let the mixed strategy m be defined by m(G) = τ ({n ∈
N:fn ∈ G}) for all G ⊆ F. Thus, intuitively, m prescribes choosing n ∈N according to τ and
then playing the pure strategy fn. This means that if the decision maker plays according to m,
then they eventually play s with probability 1, but the probability that s is played in the first T
periods is 0 for every T ∈N. This construction is similar to the optimal mixed strategy in the
proof of Theorem 1.
This mixed strategy m has no (P, ψP )-equivalent behavior strategy for any competent
algebra P on the set P of plays that contains all singleton plays and any P-specification ψP
that respects singleton plays. A precise argument follows from the proof of Theorem 6. Here
we only provide the intuition.
Let b be a behavior strategy. Also, for every n ∈N, let cn denote the history (c, . . . , c) of
length n, and let c∞ denote the play only having action c. As the probability under m that the
decision maker plays action s in the first T periods is 0 for every T ∈N, if b(cn) does not put
probability 1 on action c for some n ∈ N then b cannot be (P, ψP )-equivalent to m. So, assume
that b(cn) puts probability 1 on action c for all n ∈ N. Then, as the singleton {c∞} is contained
in the algebra P , by (7) we have ψ(b)({c∞}) = 1. Because m∗({c∞}) = 0, also in this case b
cannot be (P, ψP )-equivalent to m.
The following theorem is based on Example 1.
Theorem 6. Let P be a competent algebra on the set P of plays containing all singleton
plays, and let ψP be a P-specification that respects singleton plays. Then there exists a mixed
strategy that has no (P, ψP )-equivalent behavior strategy.
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Proof. Let a and a′ denote two different actions in A. For every n ∈N, let pn denote the play
that has action a up to period n and has action a′ from period n + 1 onwards. The sequence of
plays ( pn)n∈N converges to the play p = (a, a, . . . ).
For all n ∈N, let fn denote a pure strategy that induces the play pn. Let τ be a diffuse charge
on (N, 2N). Now consider the mixed strategy m that, intuitively, first chooses a natural number
n ∈N according to τ and then plays the pure strategy fn. Formally, for every subset F′ of the
set F of pure strategies we have
m(F′) = τ ({n ∈N | fn ∈ F′}).
Hence, for every P′ ⊆ P,
m∗(P′) = τ ({n ∈N | pn ∈ P′}).
We show that the mixed strategy m has no (P, ψP )-equivalent behavior strategy. Indeed,
take any behavior strategy b. We distinguish two cases.
First, assume that there is a history of the form h = (a, . . . , a) ≺ p such that the charge b(h)
places probability less than 1 on action a. We can assume that h is the shortest history with
this property. Let Q be the set of all histories of the form (h, x) where x ∈ A \ {a}. The set [Q]
belongs to the algebra Rf ⊆P , and
ψP (b)([Q]) = cf(b)([Q]) = 1 − b(h)(a)> 0.
This is, however, in contradiction with m∗([Q]) = 0.
Now assume that for every history of the form h = (a, . . . , a) ≺ p, the charge b(h) places
probability 1 on action a. As ψP respects singleton plays, ψP (b)({p}) = 1. This contradicts
m∗({p}) = 0.
Thus, the mixed strategy m has no (P, ψP )-equivalent behavior strategy. 
Theorem 6 applies to several algebras that have been previously considered in the literature.
For example, Dubins (1974) considered the algebra generated by open sets, and Purves and
Sudderth (1976) considered the Borel sigma-algebra. Part of the authors’ motivation concerns
stating finitely additive generalizations of classical probabilistic limit laws in the usual fashion.
Both the previously mentioned algebras are competent and contain all singletons, and their
corresponding specifications respect singleton plays. In the remainder of this subsection we
show that Theorem 6 applies to the algebra generated by the open sets and the corresponding
specification.
Given a charge μ on the clopen subsets of P, Dubins (1974) defined a probability for each
open subset of P through inner approximations by clopen sets. That is, if O ⊆ P is open, then
he let μ′(O) be the supremum of μ(Z) where Z ⊆ O is clopen. His Theorem 2 showed that this
mapping μ′ defined on the open sets has a unique extension to a charge on the whole algebra
generated by the open sets.
By translating the result of Dubins (1974), we now define a competent algebra and a
specification. For every behavior strategy b and open set O ⊆ P we let
co(b)(O) = sup
Z∈RDS,Z⊆O
ψDS(b)(Z). (8)
Let Ro be the algebra generated by the open subsets of P. That is, Ro is the smallest algebra
of subsets of P that contains all open sets. By Lemma 3, Rf ⊆RDS ⊂Ro. So, in particular, Ro
is competent.
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By the result of Dubins (1974), for every behavior strategy b there is a unique charge ψo(b)
on the algebra Ro such that, for every open set O ⊆ P,
ψo(b)(O) = co(b)(O). (9)
Observe the following. If Q ∈Rf then Q ∈RDS, and hence in view of (9), (8), and (4) we
have for every behavior strategy b that
ψo(b)(Q) = co(b)(Q) =ψDS(b)(Q) = cf(b)(Q). (10)
This means that ψo is an Ro-specification.
Lemma 6. The algebra Ro contains all singleton plays, and the Ro-specification ψo respects
singleton plays.
Proof. Since each singleton {p}, where p ∈ P, is closed, Ro contains all singleton plays.
We now show that ψo respects singleton plays. Let b be a behavior strategy and let p =
(a1, a2, . . . ) ∈ P. For each n ∈N, let Hn ⊂ An denote the set of histories at period n that follow
p until period n − 1 and then deviate from an at period n:
Hn = {(a1, . . . , an−1, a):a = an},
and let Qn = H1 ∪ · · · ∪ Hn. For each n ∈N, we have Qn ∈Rf, and hence, by (10),
ψo(b)(Qn) = cf(b)(Qn) = 1 − cf(b)([a1, . . . , an]) = 1 −
n∏
k=1
b(a1, . . . , ak−1)(ak).
Now take any clopen set Q ⊂ P \ {p}. It is easy to see that there is n ∈N such that Q ⊆ Qn.
Indeed, otherwise p would be a limit point of Q, which is impossible. As Qn ⊂ P \ {p}, we
obtain
sup
Q∈RDS,Q⊆P\{p}
ψo(Q) = sup
n∈N
ψo(Qn) = 1 −
∞∏
k=1
b(a1, . . . , ak−1)(ak).
Since P \ {p} is open, by (9) and (8) we have
ψo(P \ {p}) = 1 −
∞∏
k=1
b(a1, . . . , ak−1)(ak),
implying
ψo({p}) =
∞∏
k=1
b(a1, . . . , ak−1)(ak).
Thus, ψo(b) respects singleton plays. 
The next theorem follows from Lemma 6 and Theorem 6.
Theorem 7. In any decision problem there exists a mixed strategy that has no (Ro, ψo)-
equivalent behavior strategy.
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We emphasize that the specification ψo defines a charge on Ro for all behavior strategies.
Given a specific behavior strategy b, Purves and Sudderth (1976) extended the charge ψo(b)
from the algebra Ro to A(b). The algebra A(b) contains the sets of plays which can be
approximated by closed sets from the inside and open sets from the outside in such a
way that the ψo(b)-probability of their difference can be made arbitrarily small (see their
Proposition 2.1). Their Theorem 5.1 showed that all elements of the Borel sigma-algebra on
P can be approximated this way, so the Borel sigma-algebra is a subset of A(b). This means
that for every behavior strategy b there is a charge defined on the Borel sigma-algebra which
agrees with ψo(b) on the algebra Ro.
6.2. Existence of an optimal behavior strategy
The following theorem is in contrast with Theorem 5 that we obtained under the approach
of Dubins and Savage.
Theorem 8. Let P be a competent algebra on the set P of plays containing all singleton plays,
and let ψP be a P-specification that respects singleton plays. Then there exists a P-integrable
payoff function u for which there is no (P, ψP )-optimal behavior strategy.
Proof. Take an action a ∈ A. Let the payoff function u be defined as follows: if the decision
maker chooses an action other than a at period n for the first time, then the payoff is nn+1 ; if
they choose action a at all periods, then the payoff is 0. More precisely, for every n ∈N, let Hn
denote the histories of length n of the form (a, . . . , a, a′), where a′ ∈ A \ {a}. Then u( p) = nn+1
if p ∈ [Hn] for some n ∈N, and u(a, a, . . . ) = 0.
We show that u is P-integrable by proving that for every ε > 0 there exists a P-measurable
simple function u′:P →R such that |u( p) − u′( p)| ≤ ε for every p ∈ P. Indeed, take ε > 0, and
let m ∈N such that m ≥ 1−ε
ε
. Consider the partition of P consisting of the following sets:
[H1], [H2], . . . , [Hm−1],
⋃
k≥m
[Hm] \ {(a, a, . . . )}, {(a, a, . . . )}.
Since each [Hn] belongs to Rf, and since the algebra P is competent and contains all singleton
plays (in particular it contains {(a, a, . . . )}), we can conclude that all these sets belong to P .
Define the following function u′:P →R. Let u′( p) = u( p) = nn+1 if p ∈ [Hn] for some n ≤ m −
1, let u′( p) = 1 for all p ∈ ∪k≥m[Hm] \ {(a, a, . . . )}, and let u′(a, a, . . . ) = u(a, a, . . . ) = 0. It
follows that u′ is a P-measurable simple function such that |u( p) − u′( p)| ≤ ε for every p ∈ P.
It follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 6 that there is no behavior strategy b such that
U(b | P, ψP ) = 1. This means that there is no (P, ψP )-optimal behavior strategy. 
7. Concluding remarks
In a class of finitely additive decision problems, we examined equivalence between mixed
and behavior strategies, in particular for optimal strategies. Under the classical approach of
Dubins and Savage (2014), we proved that: (1) if the action space is finite, every mixed strategy
has an equivalent behavior strategy, and (2) even if the action space is infinite, at least one
optimal mixed strategy has an equivalent behavior strategy. The Dubins and Savage approach
turned out to be essentially maximal: these two statements are no longer valid if we take any
extension of the algebra considered by Dubins and Savage that includes all singleton plays.
Our results suggest that mixed strategies may be more suitable for studying finitely additive
decision problems.
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An interesting question would be to look at hybrid strategies, in which in certain parts of the
decision tree mixed strategies are used and in other parts of the decision tree behavior strategies
are used. For example, such a strategy could prescribe following a behavior strategy up to a
certain period and then, according to a mixed strategy, choosing a pure continuation strategy
for the remaining part of the decision problem.
Another interesting question is how to deal with decision problems in which multiple
decision makers are involved. These problems are substantially more difficult. Suppose that
there are two decision makers who use mixed strategies m1 and m2 respectively. The first
question is which charge arises under (m1,m2) on the set of pure strategy pairs ( f1, f2). The
pair (m1,m2) naturally induces the probability m1(F′1) · m2(F′2) on each rectangle F′1 × F′2,
where F′1 and F′2 are subsets of the sets F1 and F2 of pure strategies for the two decision
makers. The probabilities on rectangles generally do not have a unique extension to a charge
on the power set of F1 × F2. Consequently, the expected payoff under (m1,m2) is not always
uniquely defined. For further details, we refer to Flesch et al. (2017) and the references therein.
We finally remark that in decision problems in which chance moves are present we
can model chance as another, but non-strategic, decision maker who chooses their actions
according to a fixed probabilistic rule. Therefore, in such decision problems, similar questions
arise.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 2. Let P be an algebra of P, and ψP be a P-specification. Consider a
behavior strategy b. Take an arbitrary charge B ∈ C(P, 2P) that extends the charge ψP (b) ∈
C(P,P). As explained in Section 2, such an extension exists. Let φ:P → F be a function such
that if φ( p) = f then pf = p. So, φ( p) is a pure strategy that induces the play p.
For a set G ⊆ F, define
m(G) = B({pf :f ∈ G ∩ φ(P)}).
Intuitively, m(G) is the probability under B of the set of plays that are induced by a pure strategy
in G ∩ φ(P). One can check that m is a mixed strategy.
Finally, take a set Q ∈P . Let G = { f ∈ F:pf ∈ Q}. Then {pf :f ∈ G ∩ φ(P)} = Q. In view of
(1), we have
m∗(Q) = m (G) = B({pf :f ∈ G ∩ φ(P)}) = B(Q).
Thus, the strategies m and b are (P, ψP )-equivalent. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider a behavior strategy b and let Q be a nonempty element of RDS
such that for every history h ∈ H for which Q|h =∅ we have
b(h)({a ∈ A:Q|(h,a) =∅}) = 1. (11)
Assume by way of contradiction that d: =ψDS(b)(Q)< 1. Then by (11) and Lemma 4 there
is an action a1 ∈ A such that Q|a1 =∅ and ψDS(b|a1 )(Q|a1 ) ≤ d. Then, once again by (11) and
Lemma 4, there is an action a2 ∈ A such that Q|(a1,a2) =∅ and ψDS(b|(a1,a2))(Q|(a1,a2)) ≤ d.
Repeating this argument leads to a play p = (a1, a2, . . . ) such that for every n ∈N we have
Q|(a1,...,an) =∅ and ψDS(b|(a1,...,an))(Q|(a1,...,an)) ≤ d. (12)
We argue that p ∈ Q. Since Q is clopen, it is closed. For any n ∈N, as Q|(a1,...,an) =∅ there
is a play pn ∈ Q such that pn  (a1, . . . , an). As the sequence of plays pn converges to p, the
closedness of Q implies that p ∈ Q, as claimed.
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Since Q is clopen, it is open too. As p ∈ Q, there exists n ∈N such that any play that
extends the history h = (a1, . . . , an) belongs to Q, i.e. [h] ⊆ Q. But then ψDS(b|h)(Q|h) = 1,
contradicting (12). 
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